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Abstract  
Almost one million people have been 
forced to leave Kosovo in search of a safe 
place for settlement. Although it has not 
been explicitly stated, the main reason that 
the Balkan states, as well as those of the 
Western world, are reluctant to receive 
them as refugees is that they believe that 
this would jeopardize their security. Some 
justify this reluctance as another assertion 
of the "Fortress Europe" ideal. 
Approaching the subject from a compre-
hensive security perspective, this article 
aims to explain how and why the Kosovar 
refugees may threaten, or may be per-
ceived to threaten, the national security of 
the receiving states as well as regional and 
international stability. In so doing, it 
discusses some methodological problems 
concerning the definition of security; it 
relates refugee migration to the various 
levels of security analysis; and it examines 
the impact of refugee activities with 
reference to the various security sectors.  
Resume  
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occidental, repugnent a recevoir ces gens 
comme refugies est qu' ils sont consideres 
comme une menace ala securite. Certains 
justifient cette repugnance en y voyant une 
assertion de plus de l'ideal de l'Europe 
Forteresse. Approchant Ie sujet dans une 
perspective comprehensive sur les 
questions de s€curite, Ie present article 
vise a expliquer comment et pourquoi les 
refugies kosovars pourraient tendre a 
menacer, ou pourraient €lre per9us 
comme tendant a menacer, la securite 
nationale des etats hOtes, autant que les 
stabilites regionales et internationales. Ce 
faisant, il discute aussi certains problemes 
methodologiques concernant la definition 
de l'idee de securite; illie la question de la 
migration des refugies aux differentes 
perspectives de l' analyse des questions de 
securite; il examine l'impact des activites 
des refugies en rapport avec les differents 
secteurs sensibles sous l' aspect de la 
securite.  
Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to examine 
the relationship between refugees and 
national security in order to show under 
what circumstances the Kosovar refugees 
may threaten, or may be perceived to 
threaten, the security of the actual and/ or 
prospective receiving states as well as 
that of their home country (Yugoslavia). 
In so doing, it will approach the subject 
from a comprehensive security 
perspective and will draw on the 
framework of Barry Buzan and his col-
leagues.1 To understand the relationship 
between refugees and security, one needs 
to begin with some methodological 
observations regarding the definition of 
security.  
Defining Security: Methodological  
Issues  
According to the comprehensive security 
perspective, any effort to define security 
is subject to two parameters: the 
differentiation of states and the securi-
tization of political issues.  
 
Kosovar Refugees and States as 
Unlike Units  
In contrast to the Neorealist claim that 
states are like units? the comprehensive· 
security perspective advocates that states 
differ, among other things, in terms of 
size, culture, power, ideology, etc., and 
that their character is a major factor in 
shaping international security.3 According 
to Buzan, themajordifferentiation between 
states can be seen in terms of their socio-
political cohesion, which is of central 
importance to their national security.4 
Thus, he has introduced the distinction 
between "strong" and "weak" states as an 
analytical tool to show that strong states 
are usually faced with security threats dif-
ferent from those faced by weak ones.5  
Because of their diversity, the nature 
of the national security problem differs 
substantially from state to state. The se-
curity problem differs even among the 
weak/ strong states themselves. This 
implies the impossibility of devising a 
universal definition of national security. 
Although the concept of security can be 
mapped in a general sense, it can only be 
given specific substance in relation to 
concrete cases. This, in turn, implies the 
impossibility and the inadvisability of 
defining refugee flows as a security 
problem with general application. Thus, 
whether or not the Kosovar refugees con-
stitute a security problem depends on 
which state one refers to.  
Kosovar Refugees and  
Securitization  
The problem of defining security in rela-
tion to refugee migration becomes more 
acute due to the" securitization" of refu-
gee issues.6 Securitization means that an 
issue is presented as an existential threat, 
requiring emergency measures. 
According to the securitization process, 
something is designated as a security 
issue because it can be argued that it is 
more important than other subjects. By  
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framing an issue as a special kind of 
politics or as above politics, securitization 
represents an extreme version of 
politicization, or the integration of an issue 
into public policy.7  
Security thus becomes a self-referential 
practice, because itis in this practice that a 
subject becomes a security issuenot 
necessarily because a real existential threat 
exists, but because the issue is presented as 
such a threat. Moreover, because social 
groups within different states have the 
power to designate an issue as a security 
one, security becomes a social construct 
with different meanings in different 
societies.8  
This means two things. First, some 
national societies may consider the ex-
istence of Kosovar refugees within the 
territories of their states as a threat to their 
security, while others may not. And second, 
the Kosovar refugees may not pose any real 
existential threattothe receiving states or 
their home country, but particular social 
groups within those states may be 
successful in framing them as a "security 
problem." Thus, any attempt to classify 
types of threats from refugee flows runs 
into distinctions between real and perceived 
threats, or "into paranoid notions of threat 
or mass anxieties that can best be described 
as xenophobic and racist."9  
The securitization of refugee issues 
becomes a considerable process because the 
distinction between refugees and 
immigrants is blurred in the eyes of the 
citizens of the host countries. 10 Refugees 
are not the only foreigners living within the 
boundaries of the receiving states. Most 
often, these are people who immigrated 
voluntarily and for economic reasons, 
inhabiting the host countries before the 
arrival of refugees. When such migrants 
have already affected, or are perceived as 
having affected, the security of the 
receiving states and their citizens, then 
refugees are seen automatically as potential 
threats whether or not they share common 
ethnicity, language, culture, religion with 
the earlier migrants. For the host society in 
general, migrants and refugees are all 
foreigners whose presence and actions 
jeopardize their own security and that of 
their state.  
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This implies that the migration of 
Kosovar refugees has, from the very be-
ginning, been seen as a potential threat to 
the national security of those states which 
already have a considerable number of 
migrants living within their territories, like 
Germany, France, Greece and others. 
Kosovar refugees mayor may not pose 
security threats to the potential or actual 
receiving states, but the very fact that other 
"foreigners" have already done so is 
enough to make the mentioned countries 
sceptical about receiving new "foreigners", 
whether migrants or refugees. This 
explains why states have been so reluctant 
to receive a significant number of Kosovar 
refugees.  
Kosovar Refugees and Levels of  
. Security Analysis  
To understand security and how it is seen 
being affected by refugee movements, one 
should focus on the various levels of 
analysis. While Kenneth Waltz puts 
emphasis on three levels of analysis 
(individuals, states, and international 
system), the comprehensive security 
theorists focus on five distinct, though 
inter-related, levels (individuals, subunits, 
units, international subsystems, and 
international system).l1 The com-
prehensive security perspective provides a 
link between those levels by arguing that a 
state can be threatened equally from within 
and from without. 12  
External security is identified as the 
ability of the state to defend itself from 
external coercion or attack, with an 
emphasis on the military dimension of 
security. Within the state, security is 
defined in terms of the capacity of a 
govemmentto protect itself from domestic 
disorder. A state can be threatened from 
below (by individual or organizational 
pressures on the government) and from 
above (by oppressive or threatening 
governmental policies and actions).13 
Here, emphasis is shifted to the non-
military aspects of security.  
The above implies that the Kosovar 
refugees may threaten (or may be per-
ceived as threatening) the external and 
internal security of their home and re-
ceiving states. To understand how, one 
needs to focus on the dimensions of se-
curity.14  
 
Dimensions of Security  
There are five sectors to which the concept 
of security applies: military, political, 
economic, societal and environmentaL 
These sectors are so interdependent that 
changes in one sector, whether positive or 
negative, affect other sectors. This means 
that if and when refugees affect one 
security sector, by the same token they 
affect other security sectors.  
Military Security  
In the military sector, the referent of se-
curity is mainly the state and military action 
usually threatens all its components. It may, 
for instance, repress the idea of state, 
subject its physical base to strain, and 
damage and destroy its various national 
institutions. Military actions not only strike 
the state's basic protective functions, but 
also threaten the layers of social and 
individual interest that underlie, and are 
more permanent than, the state's 
superstructures.1S  
Because they may be trying to achieve a 
special status (independence or autonomy) 
for the region from which they come, or 
because they may be trying to unify this 
region with the receiving state, refugees 
may threaten the military security of states 
in four ways. The first is when they use the 
territory of the receiving state for initiating 
military activities against their home 
country, which may hold the receiving state 
responsible for those activities even if it 
does not politically support such activities. 
Second, refugees may convince the 
receiving state to undertake direct actions 
against their home country. Third, the 
receiving state may have an interest in 
challenging the regime of the refugees' 
home country and may use them as a means 
to this end. And fourth, by imposing a 
substantial economic burden, refugees may 
directly affect the receiving states' financial 
capabilities. Because there is a close 
relationship between economic and military 
capability, the presence of refugees has an 
indirect impact on the host countries' 
military capabilities, which are crucial to 
that states' external security.  
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In the Kosovar case, a distinction 
should be drawn between refugee ac-
tivities in Yugoslavia and neighbouring 
states, and their activities in other states. 
For example, the Kosovar refugees may 
try to influence the policy of receiving 
states that are not geographically attached 
to Yugoslavia, with the aim of 
convincing them to undertake actions 
against it, thereby creating a threat to the 
relations between home and receiving 
countries.  
On the other hand, the Kosovar refu-
gees who have emigrated to Yugoslavia's 
neighbouring states, especially to Albania 
and FYROM (Macedonia), may threaten 
the external security of Yugoslavia either 
by convincing the governments of those 
states to undertake actions against 
Yugoslavia, or by initiating military 
activities against it from the territory of 
the receiving stateswith or without 
official approval for such operations. 
Whatever the case, such activities may 
attract a violent response from 
Yugoslavia, which may consider the host 
country responsible for those activities. 
Such a situation between Yugoslavia and 
Albania, for instance, could lead to war.  
Whether acting in Yugoslavia's 
neighbouring states or not, the intention 
of the Kosovar refugees may be either to 
achieve independence for Kosovo or to 
unify it with the receiving state. The idea 
of a Greater Albania fits into this pattern. 
Whatever their purpose, such activities 
may easily jeopardize regional stability, 
affecting both national and international 
security. This is so not only because 
refugee activities may poison the 
relations between any pair of states, but 
because they can also attract the attention 
of other regional states, of great powers 
and international institutions. The Bal-
kans comprise a sensitive region where 
conflicts, once begun, are difficult to 
contain.  
Political Security  
Political threats undermine the organi-
zational stability of the state by threat-
ening its national identity and its 
organising ideology, as well as the insti-
tutions that express them. While in the  
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military sector threats are mainly exter-
nal to the state, in the political sector a 
state may be threatened both internally 
and externally.  
Internal threats may arise as a result of 
governmental actions that threaten and 
constrain individuals or groups. 
Resistance to the government, efforts to 
change its policies or overthrow it, or 
political movements aimed at autonomy 
or independence, all foment state 
insecurity.  
Externally, a state can be threatened 
by the ideology of another state, such as 
nationalism, fundamentalism, liberal 
democracy, communism, etc. In this 
sense, when refugees and receiving states 
share a similar ideology, their union may 
pose a political threat to the refugees' 
home country. For example, if 
democracy is an ideology common to the 
receiving states and the Kosovar 
refugees, this may pose an existential 
threatto the autocratic Yugoslav regime.  
On the other hand, when refugees are 
holders of an ideology different than that 
of the receiving state, they then may be 
perceived as a political threatto latter. 
For instance, if the Kosovar refugees 
display a preference for religious funda-
mentalism, this could clash with the 
secular ideology of the Western host 
countries. If the Kosovar refugees are 
exponents of extreme Albanian nation-
alism, they then may be seen as a threat 
to the identity of receiving states such as 
Greece and FYROM. In fact, political 
threats become more serious when na-
tionalist ideology prevails, and when 
states define their security in terms of 
territory and population not under their 
control. The concept of a Greater Serbia 
or of a Greater Albania are cases in 
point.  
An external political threat may be 
easily transformed into an internal one. 
For instance, threats to national identity 
may involve attempts to heighten the 
ethno-cultural differences among groups 
within a target-state. Thus, if a host 
country does not share a common 
ideology with the Kosovar refugees, it 
may become subject to external threats 
coming either from the refugees' home 
country or any other rival state. Either of 
them may try to heighten the existence of  
 
competing ideologies within the receiv-
ing state to achieving its foreign policy 
ends. For example, Greece may face po-
litical threats from Turkey, and FYROM 
from Albania and possibly Yugoslavia.  
State political security can also be 
threatened when refugees are opposed to 
the regime of their home country and are 
involved in anti-regime activities in the 
host country. For instance, democratic 
regimes in W estern host countries will 
most certainly allow Kosovar refugees to 
speak out against the Yugoslav regime, 
allow them access to media, and may 
even permit them to send information and 
money back home in support of the 
opposition. In such a case, Yugoslavia 
may hold the receiving states responsible 
for the activities of the Kosovar refugees 
whether or not they support such 
activities. On the other hand, some 
receiving states may provide active 
support to the Kosovar refugees to 
achieve their ends.  
In either case, Yugoslavia may feel 
forced to plant intelligence operations 
abroad to monitor the activities of refu-
gees, and its embassy may provide en-
couragement to its supporters within the 
Serbian diaspora. This implies that a 
conflict may develop between Kosovars 
and Serbs within the territory of receiving 
states. Moreover, the Serbian diaspora 
itself may become riven by conflicts 
among competing groups, or between 
sections of the diaspora and the Yugoslav 
government. Thus, struggles that would 
otherwise take place within Yugoslavia 
may become internationalized. 
Additionally, the Serbian diasporamay 
become hostile to the host country and its 
activities, potentially undermining the 
receiving states' internal stability.  
Kosovar refugees may also threaten 
the political security of their home coun-
try by providing financial and military 
assistance to rebel groups or by mar-
shalling international public opinion 
through publicity campaigns aimed at the 
international community and at particular 
international institutions.  
Kosovar refugees may also affect the 
internal security of the host countries by 
initiating activities (terrorism, violent 
protests, etc.) against the governments  
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of those states that are not willing to take 
action against Yugoslavia, or that are 
determined to maintain friendly relations 
with its present government. This may be 
one of the reasons for which Greece is 
reluctant to receive many Kosovar 
refugees. This implies that when the 
interests of the Kosovar refugees are in 
sharp contrast to those of the receiving 
states, these interests may be jeopardized 
by the external security policies of those 
states.  
In response, the Kosovar refugees may 
try to exert significant pressures upon 
receiving states through public opinion. 
Political activity by those refugees may 
become a source of conflict between the 
home and host governments. But if the 
Kosovar refugees operate within the law, 
there is little that the host governments can 
do. As a consequence, relations between 
countries can be strained.  
The problem for governments that wish 
to refrain from taking actions against 
Yugoslavia may become more acute if the 
Kosovar refugees manage to obtain the 
support of the natives of the receiving 
states. The problem may become even more 
serious if they obtain the support of a 
significant minority within the receiving 
state with whom they share common 
ethnicity, religion, language, etc. The case 
of FYROM is illustrative of such a 
situation. This may lead to a considerable 
social upheaval or even to secessionist 
movements that may invite a violent 
response from the governments of the 
receiving states. Apart from threats arising 
from domestic law-making, the Kosovar 
refugees may be threatened by 
administrative or political action and 
activities related to the enforcementoflaw 
and order. In turn, they may undertake 
certain activities to minimize the impact of 
the receiving state's policies and actions. 
Whatever the scenario, the governments of 
the receiving states may be pushed to take a 
less friendly stance toward the 
Kosovarrefugees, while anti-foreign 
sentiments may rise due to their activities. 
Where the state and those living within it 
are severely at odds, domestic disarray may 
threaten the coherence of the state and 
consequently its security.  
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Because refugees tend to maintain a 
strong connection with their home 
countries, even if a satisfactory political 
settlement is reached in Yugoslavia, any 
subsequent turbulence or instability in the 
post-conflict Kosovo may find expression 
within the Kosovar communities abroad, 
thereby bringing external problems into 
host societies.  
In sum, refugees can playa significant 
independent political role in world politics. 
Their continued political involvement in 
states whose rules they are not subject to, 
present a serious challenge to the 
sovereignty of that state. By the same 
token, they challenge the ability of host 
states to exercise independent control over 
the direction of their own foreign and 
domestic policy. Paradoxically, the risk 
may be particularly high if the host country 
has gone so far as to arm refugees against 
their country of origin. Guns can be pointed 
in both directions, and the receiving 
country takes the risk that refugees will 
seek to dictate the host country's policies 
towards their home country.16  
Political threats pose an even greater 
danger to weak states, whether home 
(Yugoslavia) orreceiving (FYROM, Al-
bania). Such threats seek to re-orient the 
political behaviour of the state by ma-
nipulating the main factional disputes 
within it. Thus, a state may not threaten 
another state in a simple, direct fashion. 
Instead, it may participate in domestic 
disputes between various factions, backing 
whichever one seems most likely to pursue 
policies in its favour. That is why the 
Serbian opposition to the regime of 
Milosevic has become the hope of the 
Kosovars, as well as of the Balkan and 
Western states. Yet the Yugoslav case 
shows that there are countless possible 
variations in the style of political 
intervention. These range from support to 
legal parties in a relatively stable electoral 
system, to encouragement of-and military 
support forarmed struggle within the target-
state. Intervention may be aimed at 
changing the ideological character of the 
government, or at encouraging secessionist 
forces within the state. Voluntarily or not, 
refugees may serve as valuable instruments 
for such intervention.  
 
Economic Security  
Economic threats can be internal or ex-
ternal, intentional or unintentional. 
Whatever their type, economic threats may 
result in materialloss and strain on various 
institutions of the state, while they may 
undermine the health and longevity of the 
population. Thus, they are concerned with 
the sustainability of acceptable levels of 
welfare and state power.  
Although economic threats are the most 
difficult to handle within the framework of 
national security, when their consequences 
reach beyond the strictly economic sector 
into military and political spheres, then 
three national security issues emerge. The 
linkages involved are between economic 
capability on the one hand, and military 
capability, power, and socio-political 
stability on the other.I7 With all three 
linkages, economic deterioration produces 
the same result: weakening the power and 
strength of states, and an enhancement of 
their internal and external insecurity. This is 
one of the reasons for which it has been 
argued that, by pushing the Kosovars into 
Albania and FYROM, the Yugoslav 
Government has attempted to weaken and 
destabilize those countries.  
Refugees may threaten the economic 
security of the receiving states by imposing 
limits to their financial capability. Refugees 
are usually so numerous and so poor that 
they create a substantial economic burden, 
straining housing, education, sanitation, 
transportation and communication facilities 
while increasing consumption. To deal with 
this economic burden, the receiving states 
may have to increase taxes paid by their 
own citizens.  
National societies, or specific social 
groups within them, may therefore react 
negatively to an influx of refugees first, 
because of the economic costs the latter 
impose on the receiving state; second, 
because of the refugees' purported social 
behaviour, such as welfare dependency, 
which affects the host country's individual 
tax payers; and third, because refugees may 
displace local people in employment when 
they are  
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prepared to work for lower wages. 
These are the reasons that have been 
put forward by various states to justify 
their reluctance to receive Kosovar 
refugees.  
Due to the above reasons, a 
considerable degree of social hostility 
may be created not only against the 
refugees, but against all foreigners 
living in host countries. Created by 
economic considerations, social 
hostility may undermine the socio-
political cohesion of states thereby 
affecting their security. Finally, by 
directly affecting the receiving state's 
financial capability, refugees have an 
indirect impact on the same state's 
military capability and overall power.  
Societal Security  
In the societal sector, the referent of 
security is collective identities-religious 
or national, for example-that can func-
tion independent of the state. In rela-
tions between states, significant 
external threats on the societal level are 
often part of a larger package of 
military and political threats, all of 
which may be difficult to disentangle. 
Even the interplay of ideas and 
communication may produce politically 
significant societal and cultural threats, 
as illustrated by the reaction of Western 
states to Islamic fundamentalism. 
Language, religion, and cultural 
tradition all play their part in the 
ideology of the state, and may need to 
be defended or protected against 
cultural imports.18  
As in the political sector, threats in 
the societal sector may arise internally 
or externally, while an internal threat 
may be transformed into an external 
one and vice versa. If societal security is 
about the sustainability of traditional 
patterns of language, culture, and reli-
gious and ethnic identity, then threats 
to these values come much more fre-
quently from within states than from 
without them. The Bosnian and 
Kosovar cases have revealed that the 
state-nation building process often aims 
at suppressing, or at least assimilating, 
sub-state social identities. As a result, 
internal societal threats may precipitate 
conflict between states (as between Al-
bania and Yugoslavia, or between Yu-
goslavia and Croatia) if either wishes to  
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protect groups of people within the 
others with whom they have close 
affinities.  
In the long term, the most obvious 
effect of refugee migration is the 
creation of ethnic minorities in host 
countries. Admitting refugees has long-
lasting social effects on receiving states. 
It may turn relatively homogeneous 
societies into multi-ethnic and 
multicultural ones. Refugees often raise 
societal concerns because they 
potentially threaten the popularity and 
strength of the nation-state. They 
challenge traditional notions about 
membership within a state, the meaning 
of nationality and citizenship, and the 
rights and duties of citizens towards 
their state and vice versa.19 As it is has 
been very correctly pointed out, the fact 
that very few states fi t the idealized 
picture of the homogeneousnation-state, 
and that most states ' are cultural and 
social products of earlier movements of 
people, often fails to register in popular 
consciousness.2o  
Nevertheless, it is generally 
accepted that the existence of refugees 
has a substantial impact on the inter-
related factors of social stability and 
economic prosperity. By becoming 
citizens of the receiving state, refugees 
create a cultural,linguistic, religious 
and possibly an ethnically distinct 
minority within the host country, 
thereby altering the nature of its 
society. Thus, the migration of 
Kosovar refugees may threaten com-
munal identity and culture by directly 
altering the ethnic, cultural, religious 
and linguistic characterisation of the 
population of the receiving state.  
Kosovar refugees may be seen as a 
threat to the cultural norms and value 
systems of the receiving states. If, in 
fact, the Kosovar refugees violate these 
norms and values, the citizens of the 
receiving states may see this violation 
as a threat to national security.21 In de-
fending itself against those refugees, 
national societies may emphasise their 
differentiation from Kosovar society. 
Questions of status and "race" may be 
difficult to avoid as a consequence.  
From the above, it becomes clear 
that refugee migration is often 
accompanied by a clash of rival 
cultural identities. In combination, 
refugee migration threats  
 
and the clash of cultures contribute to a 
societal conflict between domestic and 
refugee societies.22 As has already been 
shown, this conflict may easily feed 
into a massive restructuring of relations 
between the hosting and home states 
which may, in turn, affect international 
security.  
The governments of the receiving 
states are concerned because of the mi-
grants' purported social behaviour, such 
as criminality and black market labour, 
that may generate local resentment 
which, in turn, may lead to xenophobic 
popular sentiment and to the rise of 
anti-immigrant political parties 
threatening to the govemmenton power. 
In France, for instance, the National 
Front has utilized anti-immigrant slo-
gans to increase its electoral power. 
Thus, countries receiving Kosovar refu-
gees need to maintain social stability 
and cohesion in the face of the multi-
culturalism produced by refugee migra-
tion. It is possible, however, that under 
certain circumstances, governments 
may pursue anti-immigration policies 
in anticipation of public reactions.  
How and why refugees are perceived 
as culturally threatening is a compli-
cated issue, involving how the host 
community initially defines itself. 
Cultures differ with respect to how they 
define who belongs to, or can be 
admitted into, their community. These 
norms govern whom one admits and 
what rights and privileges are given to 
those who are permitted to enter. Thus, 
themostplausible explanation for the 
willingness of states to accept or reject 
immigrants is ethnic, cultural and 
religious affinity. 23 A government and 
its citizens are likely to be receptive to 
those who share the same language, 
religion, or ethnicity, while it might 
regard as threatening those with whom 
such an identity is not shared. That is 
why the Kosovar refugees are more 
welcome in Albania and Turkey than 
they are in Greece, France or Germany. 
But what constitutes "ethnic affinity" 
is, again, a social construct that can 
change over time. Moreover, what 
constitutes cultural affinity for one 
group in a multi-ethnic society may 
represent a cultural, social, and eco-
nomic threat to another. For example,  
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the Kosovar refugees are welcomed by 
those of Albanian origin living in FYROM, 
but not by the Serbs living in the same 
country.  
Societies are also seen to have a limited 
threshold of toleration for refugee 
migration if their flow begins to undermine 
the social and political cohesion of the 
receiving country. This threshold is affected 
by economic, social and cultural 
circumstances in the receiving society, as 
well as by the nature of refugees 
themselves. As many cases have revealed, 
anti-immigrant feeling and xenophobia also 
increases in times of recession and high 
unemployment. Toleration levels are likely 
to be lower in countries without a tradition 
of immigration, and higher in those that 
have. Refugees that are similar to the host 
population are also easier to accommodate 
and tolerate than if they are ethnically and 
culturally distinct, which is why Greece has 
been more tolerant to Albanians of Greek 
origin than to Albanians of a different 
background.  
Environmental Security  
In the environmental sector, the range of 
possible referents of security is large. The 
basic concerns, however, are how human 
beings and the rest of biosphere are related. 
Many cases, including the Kosovar refugee 
migration to FYROM and Albania, have 
shown that refugees can be seen as an 
environmental threat, and as a consequence, 
hostility towards them can be generated 
when they consume significant amounts of 
natural resources such as water and produce 
waste. Although environmental threats, 
such as water pollution, link activities 
within one state to effects in another, in the 
case of the Kosovar refugees, no 
international links can be identified.  
Conclusion  
A set of conclusions that may serve as 
policy guidelines can be drawn from this 
consideration of the relationship between 
refugees and security. The first conclusion 
is that repatriation constitutes the best 
alternative for the international community 
in dealing with refugee problems. 
However, a prerequisite for repatriation is 
the existence of a  
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just political settlement accepted by all 
sides in the conflict. Such a settlement will 
minimize or eliminate the possibility of 
refugees abroad acting against their home 
country, with or without the official 
approval of the receiving states, thereby 
minimizing the possibilities of conflict 
between home and host countries.  
Although a political settlement may 
provide fertile ground for repatriation, 
additional guarantees should be given to 
refugees that their daily life will not be 
affected in post-conflict society by the 
bitterness created before and during the 
conflict. Conflict brings with it deep 
hostility which needs to gradually 
evaporate if peaceful relations among the 
competing communities are to be firmly 
established. The international community 
should assist to that end.  
Conflict may also bring with it sig-
nificant destruction. States that have 
experienced domestic conflicts are usually 
economically weak and therefore unable to 
reconstruct after the conflict has 
terminated. Because there is a strong inter-
relationship between domestic and 
international security, it is in the interest of 
the international community to assist the 
reconstruction of tom states in an effort to 
stabilize them. If the international 
community fails to do so, domestic 
weakness and instability will easily spill 
over from those states, thereby jeopardising 
regional and international stability.  
Finally, the receiving states should be 
very careful in their social, political and 
economic planning in order to avoid, or 
minimise, domestic dissatisfaction that may 
lead to the creation of feelings of 
xenophobia and racism, since such feelings 
may, in turn, destabilize not only the 
domestic environment of the host states, 
but also their relations with the refugees' 
home country.1I  
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